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Tradition and the Law:                             
A Response to Wax 
DANA NELKIN* 
Professor Wax’s paper begins with the observation that there is no 
unified, systematic exposition of the anti-gay-marriage position.1  It then 
makes a subtle and skillful attempt to develop such a position by appeal 
to a conservative line of thought that rests on respect for tradition in 
assessing political and social change.2  Wax points to Edmund Burke and 
Michael Oakeshott as leading representatives of this general approach,3 
while exploring the ways in which their views might be understood to 
apply to an issue that they themselves did not discuss.  Although I am 
skeptical that the position Wax presents succeeds in its aim, I do believe 
that she provides a great service in bringing a case of this kind to the 
table.  Only when we have a real, developed position in hand, can we do 
justice to the issue in evaluating it.  The following provides a brief 
overview of some key points in Wax’s paper and the start of an evaluation. 
In the first part of Wax’s paper, the conservative approach is spelled 
out, and it is made clear that both Edmund Burke and Michael Oakeshott 
advocate adherence to traditional ways of doing things as the result of 
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accumulated wisdom based on experience.4  Further, both Burke and 
Oakeshott are distrustful of basing attempts at change on abstract 
reasoning.5  Burke worries that we are more likely to go wrong if we leave 
tradition behind, because we cannot possibly predict the consequences of 
our decisions if we stick to reason alone.6  Oakeshott worries that trying 
to justify ourselves at “the bar of reason” will lead to an attempt at 
perfection and so ultimately to paralysis,7 and he also worries that reason 
demands consistency and exceptionless principles which are too simple 
for the real complex world we inhabit.8  Both acknowledge, however, 
that change happens organically, and that some change is good.9
The second part of Wax’s paper seeks a heuristic, based on these 
considerations, for when we should accept change.10  As Wax makes clear, 
Burke offers a very explicit one: for legislative change, it is at least 
necessary that a majority of people want change and that—despite their 
reverence for tradition—they see the status quo as intolerable.11  It 
appears less certain that Oakeshott offers as clear a criterion. 
In the third part of the paper, Wax seeks to apply the line of reasoning 
developed so far to the case of gay marriage, and identifies aspects of the 
pro-gay-marriage movement that Burke’s and Oakeshott’s reasoning 
would lead us to resist.12  For example, she argues, on this line of 
reasoning, the fact that only a minority is pushing for change and the fact 
that the movement is driven by principles provide strong reasons to resist 
change in favor of gay marriage.13  Further, in response to demands that 
opponents provide evidence that change would bring destruction in its 
wake, Burke and Oakeshott would respond that such demands places the 
burden of proof in exactly the wrong corner.14
After this, the conclusion of the paper is a bit surprising, since Wax 
does not quite answer whether Burke and Oakeshott’s reasoning leads to 
a rejection of gay marriage.  She seems to hesitate for at least two reasons.  
First, circumstances have changed in certain ways.  For example, there is 
a need for adult care as we human beings live longer and participation in 
gay marriage can increase the number of caregivers.15  Second, it is 
 4. Id. at 1064–67. 
 5. Id. at 1066. 
 6. Id. at 1064. 
 7. Id. at 1065. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 1067. 
 10. Id. at 1067–71. 
 11. Id. at 1069. 
 12. Id. at 1071–1101. 
 13. Id. at 1073. 
 14. Id. at 1080. 
 15. Id. at 1100–01. 
NELKIN.DOC 10/12/2005  10:15 AM 
[VOL. 42:  1111, 2005]  Tradition and the Law 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 1113 
 
unclear that marriage will survive if it does not adapt to the movement in 
support of gay marriage.16
Professor Wax has provided a very helpful elucidation of a traditional 
line of thought and addressed the fascinating question of whether this 
line provides the answer conservatives are seeking in the case of gay 
marriage.  It may be, of course, that most actual opponents of gay 
marriage base their views on religious beliefs, or on beliefs that are 
secular and inchoate, and so do not adopt the well-developed, secular, 
and traditional line of thought developed in this paper.  However, it is a 
great benefit to have such a view on the table.  Naturally, her paper 
raises a few questions. 
While it is not clear why Burke adopts the particular heuristic that he 
does, it seems pretty clear that some of his necessary conditions, such as 
majority approval for endorsing change, are simply not met when it 
comes to gay marriage in the United States in 2005.  For example, recent 
elections have shown that the majority—at least in many states—is 
disinclined toward social change in this area.  Given Burke’s heuristic, it 
seems pretty clear that Burke should reject gay marriage.  Thus, it is puzzling 
that Wax hesitates at the end of her paper.  The following hypothesis 
might resolve the puzzle: she is giving more weight to Burke’s general 
rationale—his faith in tradition over reason—than to the particular 
heuristic that is supposed to arise from it.  The heuristic simply does not 
match the general rationale, and it is reasonable to favor the general 
rationale over the heuristic. 
Wax sets out to construct a respectable case for opposition to gay 
marriage.  Does the reasoning of Burke and Oakeshott meet that standard?  
For Burke, at least, the whole point is that respecting tradition and 
making slow incremental changes is less likely to have disastrous 
consequences than sudden change divorced from tradition.  It is interesting 
that we now have as part of our history some rather large and fairly fast 
principle-driven changes.  Moreover, these are precisely the sort of 
principles to which gay marriage advocates now appeal.  Consider, for 
example, the principled end to slavery in the South.  Thus, some principled 
changes fared well, even though perhaps some have not.  Nevertheless, 
these changes themselves provide experience for us to draw on.  One 
might argue that we have a toss-up, then, between slow change and fast, 
principled change, with different experiences supporting each course of 
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action.  Or perhaps principled change comes out ahead.  There is quite a 
record to examine.  This is not a criticism that the conservative line gets the 
wrong outcome in the case of slavery, although it does.  It is rather that, 
given accumulating tradition, it is not at all clear that tradition itself 
speaks in favor of only small, slow, unprincipled changes.  All this is 
consistent with the kinds of considerations Wax raises at the end of her 
paper. 
It appears, then, that if Burke’s majority requirement is bracketed, his 
ultimate rationale, together with the data, might not lead to a rejection of 
gay marriage, after all.  In contrast, Oakeshott’s reasoning seems to lead 
more directly to an anti-gay-marriage stance because Oakeshott seems 
motivated more directly by a distrust of principle.  He associates principle 
with exceptionlessness, and this, in turn, with oversimplification of a 
complex world.  With principle thus tainted, it seems that we should be 
suspicious of principle-driven change all by itself, whether the majority 
is behind it or not.17  But this is a mistake.  Proponents of change are 
happy to countenance exceptions, just so long as they are principled 
ones.  (Whether we have a single exceptionless principle or a principle 
with a variety of principled exceptions is a matter of presentation in the 
end.)  What matters is overall consistency, of course, but consistency 
need not be simple.  Once we distinguish consistency from simplicity, 
Oakeshott’s phobia about principle and reasoning is revealed.  At this 
point, the question of hypocrisy looms large, as Oakeshott tries to 
convince us of the rightness of his view.  Wax alludes to this worry at 
one point, calling it a “paradox,” but perhaps lets him off too easily.  In 
the end, Oakeshott’s argument might turn out to be more promising in 
entailing an opposition to gay marriage than Burke’s, but at a significant 
cost in the plausibility of its premise. 
Finally, both Burke and Oakeshott acknowledge that some change can 
be good.  Further, both are interested in recommending the conservative 
course because they think it will lead to better outcomes.  Yet, it is 
important to ask, what measure is being used in assessing outcomes?  Is 
an outcome better when more people have more well-being, or when 
they are more autonomous, or something else?  If any of the above, then 
perhaps they are less averse to principle than first appears. 
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